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Smart Enforcement
Theory and Practice
Florentin Blanc & Michael Faure*
Abstract
There is an increasing attention both on how inspections and enforcement efforts
with respect to regulatory breaches can be made as effective as possible. Regulatory
breaches refer to violations of norms that have been prescribed in public regulation,
such as, for example, environmental regulation, food safety regulation or regula‐
tion aiming at occupational health and safety. The enforcement of this regulation is
qualified as regulatory enforcement. It has been claimed that inspections should
not be random, but based on risk and target-specific violators and violations. Such
a “smart” enforcement policy would be able to increase the effectiveness of enforce‐
ment policy. Policy makers are enthusiastic about this new strategy, but less is
known about the theoretical foundations, nor about the empirical evidence. This
article presents the theoretical foundations for smart enforcement as well as some
empirics. Moreover, the conditions under which smart enforcement could work are
identified, but also a few potential limits are presented.
Keywords: regulatory inspections, regulatory enforcement, environmental regu‐
lations, smart regulation.
A Introduction
Laws and regulations can only contribute to the policy goals that led to their
enactment if they are effectively implemented and complied with. Whereas, for
some legislation, no specific institutions, resources or measures are required to
try and ensure such implementation and compliance, in a number of areas mod‐
ern states have allocated resources to what is commonly called “regulatory
* Dr. Florentin Blanc is a consultant to the World Bank Group, OECD, and governments on
investment climate and business environment. Prof. Michael Faure is Academic Director
Maastricht European institute for Transnational Legal Research (METRO), Maastricht
University, Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law, Maastricht
University and Academic Director of Ius Commune Research School, Maastricht University. He is
also Professor of Comparative Law and Economics at Erasmus Law School (Rotterdam).
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enforcement”.1 In many regulatory areas, however, there have been concerns
that, given scarce resources, many violations remain hidden, dissuasion is limited,
and compliance levels are insufficient. Although such claims are by definition
hard to prove (short of reliable ways to estimate compliance levels), and although
there is much evidence that dissuasion (deterrence) is far from the only driver of
regulatory compliance, there is some level of agreement that there is a real need
to make implementation of regulations as effective as possible (given constant
resources). Both the literature and practitioners have responded to this problem
through approaches such as “risk-focused targeting” or “smart enforcement”. In
simple words this refers to an enforcement strategy within which both supervi‐
sion and enforcement agencies and prosecutors focus their efforts on specific cat‐
egories of supervised entities and of (potential or confirmed) violations in order
to increase efficiency and effectiveness. They also differentiate between the regu‐
latory and enforcement tools and measures used in proportion to the risk posed
to the public interest, which is the purpose of the regulation.
One aspect of these “smart enforcement” approaches is what some opinions
in the literature refer to as a “Tit for Tat” strategy of the enforcers, whereby agen‐
cies reward firms that voluntarily report their own violations, rapidly comply with
inspectors’ recommendations, and generally display efforts to comply. These
firms receive a more lenient treatment if and when violations are found. A com‐
prehensive vision of how regulatory agencies can have a “responsive regulation”
approach to regulatory supervision and enforcement was developed already in
1992 by Ayres and Braithwaite,2 and a further broadening of this vision was that
of “smart regulation”.3 In the latter, the differentiated enforcement response
(when violations are found) goes together with the use of varied and complemen‐
tary strategies and tools to promote compliance, calling on a number of comple‐
mentary drivers (including leveraging peer pressure, social norms etc.).
Several models (including the “responsive regulation” one) have argued in
favour of an enforcement strategy whereby firms would be divided into different
classes on the basis of their compliance behaviour, the intrinsic risk posed by
their activities, or (the most widely accepted model) a combination of the two.
From a practitioner’s perspective, an application of this approach to enforcement
decisions (when violations are found) is the “Enforcement Management Model”
1 See OECD, Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections, Paris, OECD, 2014,
available at: www. oecd. org/ gov/ regulatory -policy/ enforcement -inspections. htm (last accessed 19
April 2016), which distinguishes ‘regulatory enforcement’ in its broad meaning (including all
measures that aim at ensuring implementation and compliance, including guidance, supervision
etc.) from ‘enforcement’ narrowly construed (the decisions and measures taken if a violation is
identified). In the United Kingdom, the term ‘regulatory delivery’ is used to designate the whole
spectrum of activities aiming at increasing compliance. We have kept here to the more commonly
used ‘enforcement’, which also corresponds better to our focus.
2 I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1992; R. Baldwin, ‘Why Rules Don’t Work’, The Modern Law Review,
Vol. 53, 1990, pp. 321-337.
3 N. Gunningham & P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation. Designing Environmental Policy, Oxford, Claren‐
don Press, 1998.
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of the UK’s Health and Safety Executive.4 It is the “risk framework” that allows
the planning of inspections based on the estimated potential risk (which com‐
bines probability and potential severity of hazard).5 Thus, supervision and
enforcement efforts would be correspondingly focused on those firms where risks
are higher – because violations are more likely or because the potential conse‐
quences of these violations are larger – and enforcement responses would like‐
wise be stronger when the assessment of violations suggests that the risk they
pose is higher. In both cases, “risk” is defined as the likelihood of an adverse event
combined with its potential magnitude.6
The idea of smart supervision and enforcement is therefore not to attempt to
achieve universal control, nor to do random monitoring and inspections of all
regulated entities, but to focus efforts on those where higher benefits from
inspections could be expected. Similarly, the approach is to avoid imposing sanc‐
tions in a mechanical way for any violation found, and to modulate the enforce‐
ment response based on risk and compliance behaviour. Such higher benefits of
inspections arise, for example, in situations where violations are more likely to
lead to serious consequences. Risk-based approaches thus focus on those situa‐
tions where violations could on the one hand be more likely (higher probability)
but also cause greater damage if a violation were to take place. To some extent, as
indicated, this targeting could take place on the basis of past experience with par‐
ticular regulated entities – previous behaviour is then seen as a predictor of cur‐
rent compliance. Targeting is also possible ex ante (before violations have been
established) on the basis of risk assessment, and this is one of the key tools of
“smart enforcement”. This is based on a classification that looks at intrinsic char‐
acteristics of the activity (type of industry, processes), its size or scope, as well as
additional specific risk factors (e.g. location, vulnerable populations affected etc.).
Such targeting of enforcement efforts obviously becomes especially impor‐
tant in times of budgetary constraints, and this heightens the need to use the
scarce resources available for monitoring, inspection and enforcement in a
“smart” way. Rapidly expanding new types of activities or products also place
additional stress on enforcement resources, and make risk-based approaches even
more relevant.
Moreover, and as important, “smart enforcement” takes into account the
complexity of compliance drivers, and the availability of different instruments to
increase compliance. Indeed, dissuasion (deterrence) is only one element – but
knowledge and understanding of regulations, material ability to comply, prevail‐
ing behaviour in the regulated group (peer pressure) and legitimacy of the regula‐
4 www. hse. gov. uk/ enforce/ emm. pdf.
5 See, e.g. Better Regulation Delivery Office, Common Approach to Risk Assessment, Department for
Business Innovation and Skills, 2012, available at: www. gov. uk/ government/ publications/
common -approach -to -risk -assessment.
6 See, e.g. www. gov. uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment_ data/ file/ 263921/ risk -
assessment -paper. pdf.
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tor (and of authorities more broadly) are as important, if not more so.7 With
some types of businesses (e.g. small and/or with inherently limited risks) inspec‐
tions may not be the optimal tool and other instruments to promote compliance
(such as information strategies) could be preferred. Such consideration of risk
profiles and selection of the most appropriate regulatory delivery approach is a
crucial part of “smart enforcement” broadly understood:
– How can inspection agencies actually use risk assessment in a smart way in
order to increase the effectiveness of monitoring efforts?
– What precisely does the empirical evidence concerning smart enforcement
and targeting indicate as far as the relevant factors that determine the suc‐
cess or failure of a particular targeting programme are concerned?
– If targeting strategies did succeed in particular domains and not in others,
which were the crucial factors that determined this success or failure? Hence,
on the basis of this empirical evidence, is it possible to provide elements of
“best practices” in this respect?
Although theoretical literature originating from various disciplines (criminology,
Law and Economics as well as sociology of law) has advocated smart
enforcement,8 there are, as this list indicates, still many questions concerning the
precise conditions under which such a smart enforcement approach can be effec‐
tive. The goal of our article is therefore to critically discuss “smart enforcement”
approaches and practices by highlighting both the theoretical basis as well as the
empirical evidence. Moreover, recent developments at the OECD and other policy
levels with respect to the implementation of those types of targeting strategies
will also be discussed. Several critical issues affecting the effectiveness of smart
enforcement will be identified.
The article is set up as follows: after this introduction (1) the theoretical basis
for smart enforcement and targeting will be provided (2); next the available
empirical evidence with respect to the (in)effective nature of targeting strategies
will be reviewed (3). Then, some examples of smart enforcement in practice will
be presented (4). This will be followed by a critical discussion of specific issues
related to the practical implementation of risk-based approaches (5). Section E
focuses on a few limits of smart enforcement. Section F concludes.
7 See, e.g. on the importance of legitimacy to foster compliance, and on the effects of procedural
justice on legitimacy: T.R. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’,
Crime and Justice, Vol. 30, 2003, pp. 283-357 – and on the possible negative effect on compliance
of exceedingly harsh enforcement approaches: E. Kirchler & E. Hoelzl, ‘“Modelling Taxpayers”
Behaviour as a Function of Interaction between Tax Authorities and Taxpayers’, in H. Elffers, P.
Verboon, & W Huisman (Eds.), Managing and Maintaining Compliance, The Hague, Boom Legal
Publishers, 2007, pp. 1-23.
8 Although the terminology used can differ between evidence-based enforcement, risk-based tar‐
geting and risk proportional enforcement, to some extent, as we will show, these cover similar
and in some cases different concepts.
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B Theoretical Basis for Smart Enforcement and Targeting
I Deterrence versus Cooperation
The literature has largely dealt with the question whether authorities should be
hard on violators (such as environmental polluters) and should prosecute all
cases, or whether negotiations between the violator and the enforcer, whereby
the agency tries to bring them to compliance through persuasion and by provid‐
ing information, can be more effective.9 The first is often referred to as the deter‐
rence model;10 the second is referred to as the compliance model or “cooperative
enforcement”.11 Both of those enforcement strategies have their strengths and
weaknesses.12 The principal virtue of a deterrence approach is that, following the
economic approach advocated inter alia by Gary Becker,13 it sends a clear signal to
potential violators about the expected costs (the value of the sanction multiplied
by the probability of being caught and punished). This, so the deterrence
approach holds, would provide incentives to potential perpetrators to abstain
from their violation. However, this pure deterrence approach has also been criti‐
cized both from a theoretical as well as from an empirical perspective. If deter‐
rence is not carefully targeted, it could develop a “culture of regulatory resistance”
and thus be counter-productive.14 The same is the case when compliance is
impossible as a result of practical difficulties and enforcement is therefore felt to
be unreasonable.15 Moreover, the deterrence approach is based on a rational actor
making a cost–benefit analysis, comparing the benefits of violation with the
expected sanction. However, criminological research has shown that many viola‐
tions of (environmental) regulations do not take place wilfully, but rather as a
result of a lack of information or knowledge.16 In these cases, where companies
lack adequate information and a rational cost–benefit weighing may be absent, a
deterrence approach may fail.
9 B. van Rooij, Regulating Land and Pollution in China: Law-making, Compliance and Enforcement;
Theory and Cases, Leiden, Leiden University Press, 2006, pp. 228-229 and N. Gunningham,
‘Enforcing Environmental Regulation’, Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2011, pp.
169-201.
10 S. Oded, Inducing Corporate Pro-active Compliance: Liability Controls & Corporate Monitors, (Diss.
Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands), 30 March 2012, pp. 21-54.
11 Oded, 2012, at pp. 55-78.
12 There are, moreover, in addition to the deterrence and cooperation approach, many other
enforcement strategies as well. For a more detailed account, see Gunningham, 2011, at pp.
172-192. We will not discuss those other enforcement strategies in further detail in this article.
13 G.S. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach’, The Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 76, No. 2, 1968, pp. 169-217.
14 This has been powerfully demonstrated in the work of E. Bardach & R. Kagan, Going by the Book:
The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1982.
15 K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of Pollution, Oxford
Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 198-200.
16 See inter alia Dutch research by W. Huisman, Tussen winst en moraal, achtergronden van regelnale‐
ving en regelovertreding door ondernemingen, The Hague, Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2001 and by
W. Huisman & H.G. van de Bunt, ‘Sancties, organisatie criminaliteit en milieudelicten’, Ars Aequi,
1997, pp. 684-697.
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However, there is equally overwhelming research showing that a mere coop‐
eration strategy also has several dangers. One risk is that powerful and knowl‐
edgeable companies will de facto be able to control and “capture” the agency.17
May and Winter showed that in environmental law enforcement in Denmark
cooperative enforcement was undermined by a form of “soft” capture in some
cases.18 Imposing a cooperative approach on firms who are not disposed to volun‐
tary compliance may “prove disastrous” and lead to “negotiated non-compliance”.19
Therefore, neither a deterrence approach nor a cooperative approach (based
on advice and persuasion) can in isolation be effective or efficient intervention
strategies.20 Further research suggests that compliance is more complex and is
driven by more than deterrence and cooperation. Each individual, and each
organization, may be motivated in each situation by a complex “blend” of factors,
which includes knowledge and ability to comply, rational calculations (including
cost of compliance and level of deterrence, but also potential market benefits of
compliance), social conformity (prevalent behaviour in a given group in respect of
the norms being enforced), ethical values (alignment between the individual’s
moral values and the norms in question), and the legitimacy of the authorities.
The latter is particularly important, and research21 has shown that the way
authorities (in our case, regulators) behave can strongly influence their legiti‐
macy. “Procedural justice”, which is much appreciated, involves treating regulated
entities with more respect, acting in a way that is perceived as transparent and
fair, and listening to the regulated individuals’ views and arguments. It results in
increased legitimacy, which in turn increases compliance. Conversely, exceedingly
harsh enforcement, lack of respect by inspectors, non-transparent decisions etc.
reduce procedural justice, perception, legitimacy and compliance.
II Regulatory Unreasonableness
To some extent, the criticism of the pure deterrence-based approach formulated
as early as 1982 by Bardach and Kagan constitutes the basis for a risk-based
approach to enforcement. Their consideration of “regulatory unreasonableness”
looks at what inspectors check (at least through the prism of “what they then
decide to enforce”), and does it with a prism that is closely related to “risk-based
approaches”. Their definition of “unreasonableness” can be read, in a way, as the
opposite of “risk proportionality”.
While Bardach and Kagan use the word “risk” only rarely, and do not use the
“risk-based” concept (which was yet to emerge at the time), the portrait they
make of the “good inspector” encompasses many of the fundamental aspects of
risk-based inspections “on the ground”. First, they present precisely the problem
17 Van Rooij, 2006, at p. 230 and Oded, 2012, at pp. 71-76.
18 P.J. May & S. Winter, ‘Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-Envi‐
ronmental Policy’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 18, 1999, pp. 625-651.
19 In the words of N. Gunningham, ‘Negotiated Non-Compliance: a Case Study of Regulatory Fail‐
ure’, Law & Policy, Vol. 9, 1987, pp. 69-96.
20 Gunningham, 2011, at p. 66.
21 T.R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990 and Tyler, 2003.
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that is one of the key justifications for a risk-based approach, of selecting what to
inspect:
the inspector who walks through a factory and faithfully enforces each regu‐
lation may not detect or do anything about more serious sources of risk that
happen to lie outside the rulebook; at the same time, he alienates the regula‐
ted enterprise and encourages non-cooperative attitudes (p. 123).
Indeed, at the core of onsite risk-based inspection work, there is the idea of effec‐
tive investigation, looking for the key risks. This requires knowledge of how to
prioritize, what to look for, and how to stimulate cooperation in order to get
insider information (or, barring this, to detect dissimulation, and act accord‐
ingly). Bardach and Kagan introduce their vision of the “good inspector” by anal‐
ogy with the “good cop”, whose goal is to “reduce serious crime, particularly
crimes of threat and violence” (p. 125). Translated into the regulatory field, this
corresponds to a strong focus on risk, on “harm reduction”. In order to achieve
this, the police and regulators both need cooperation – “good community relations
are an essential element of effective law enforcement” because “citizens must be
willing to inform the police of serious law violations” (ibid.). The key, in their per‐
spective, is to have inspectors that are able to spot and help solve problems, rather
than focusing on violations (pp. 79-80).
III Targeting – Differentiating Enforcement Approaches
Precisely as a consequence of the fact that a deterrence approach may work for
particular violations and particular violators but not for others, the literature has
examined whether it would be possible to distinguish between firms suited for a
cooperative approach on the one hand and firms needing a deterrence approach
on the other via the game theoretical concept of the so-called “tit-for-tat” (TFT)
strategy.22 In short, a tit-for-tat strategy refers to a game played in different pha‐
ses whereby one party (the firm) could signal its willingness to engage in coopera‐
tive behaviour to which the other party (the enforcing government) would react
with cooperative behaviour as well. Several variations of what is now referred to
as a “targeting strategy” in enforcement have been developed in the literature.
Scholz developed a targeting strategy, offering the enforcement authority the
choice between a deterrence-based and a cooperative enforcement style, based on
the initial behaviour of the firm. At the outset the firm would signal either coop‐
eration or defection and based on that, be treated with a cooperative or a deter‐
rence-based enforcement style.23 The targeting strategy has been modelled by
Harrington who showed that enforcement agencies can increase compliance by
dividing firms into different groups depending upon their compliance perform‐
ance in previous periods. Enforcement on the group that signalled “good” behav‐
iour in the first period would be based on cooperation whereas the firms belong‐
22 Oded, 2012, at pp. 82-88.
23 J.T. Scholz, ‘Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement’, Law and Soci‐
ety Review, Vol. 18, 1984, pp. 179-224.
84 European Journal of Law Reform 2018 (20) 4
doi: 10.5553/EJLR/138723702018020004004
This article from European Journal of Law Reform is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Universiteit Maastricht
Smart Enforcement
ing to the “bad” group would be confronted with a more deterrence-based, hence
tougher, approach.24
The idea of a targeting approach thus comes down to making a distinction
between different types of violators and violations, and differentiating enforce‐
ment efforts accordingly. The motivations for such a targeting approach are dou‐
ble. On the one hand, targeting is expected to increase effectiveness by better dis‐
tinguishing between different target groups of the regulated community.25 On
the other hand, it is also the result of the fact that detecting and prosecuting all
violations is not in practice feasible, for the simple reason that it would be much
too costly. Even with near-unlimited resources, it is unclear if it could be possible.
Hence, this results in a reality where, even if a deterrence approach were the pre‐
ferred one, identifying all regulatory violations and prosecuting all regulatory
crimes would be simply impossible and also not done in practice. Taking the
example of environmental regulations, empirical evidence in fact indicates that
only a small number of environmental violations are effectively prosecuted before
environmental courts using a pure deterrence approach.26 Given limited agency
assets to spend on inspections, it can even be considered a rational use of the
scarce resources of the agency to engage in “regulatory dealing”, using tolerance
in some contexts and increasing compliance for other types of violations.27 Thus
the basic model in a targeting policy is that enforcement policy will no longer be
based on a random auditing approach, but that firms will be divided into different
classes on the basis of their past compliance behaviour, as a result of which
enforcement efforts will be correspondingly focused.28
IV Filtering and Risk-Based Targeting
Another way of “targeting” is not via this rather ex post targeting (reacting to the
past performance of the firm) but rather to follow an ex ante risk-based strategy
whereby tools of risk assessment and modelling would be used, still allowing the
enforcement efforts to be targeted on those areas where they are most needed.29
24 W. Harrington, ‘Enforcement Leverage When Penalties Are Restricted’, Journal of Public Econom‐
ics, Vol. 37, 1988, pp. 29-53 and S. Rousseau, ‘Evidence of a Filtered Approach to Environmental
Monitoring’, European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 29, 2010, p. 197. See also J. Arlen & R.
Kraakman, ‘Controlling Corporate Misconduct: an Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes’, New
York University Law Review, Vol. 72, 1977, pp. 687-779.
25 For example, distinguishing between the (often smaller) badly informed enterprises that do not
wilfully defect, but often lack adequate information and for whom therefore an information and
persuasion strategy may work, and on the other hand the (often larger) well informed enterpri‐
ses who rationally decide to violate.
26 For an overview of available empirical evidence in the Flemish Region in Belgium, the Nether‐
lands, Germany and the United Kingdom. See M.G. Faure & K. Svatikova, 'Criminal or Adminis‐
trative Law to Protect the Environment?', 24 Journal of Environmental Law, 2012, pp. 253-286.
27 See A. Heyes & N. Rickman, ‘Regulatory Dealing – Revisiting the Harrington Paradox’, Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 72, 1999, pp. 361-378; K. Hawkins, Law as Last Resort – Prosecution Deci‐
sion-Making in a Regulatory Agency, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002 shows a similar situa‐
tion for occupational safety and health in the United Kingdom.
28 W. Harrington & A. Heyes, ‘The Theory of Penalties: “Leverage”, and “Dealing’”, in A. Heyes (Ed.),
The Law and Economics of the Environment, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2001, pp. 185-197.
29 Gunningham, 2011, at pp. 180-182.
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Such a risk-based approach thus uses risk assessment (based on scientific and
technical knowledge, statistical data, experience from previous years etc.) to ana‐
lyse in which areas, such as for which sectors, sub-sectors and individual estab‐
lishments, violations are likely to be most serious30 and consequently where the
higher benefits of monitoring and inspection can be generated.
In practice, a variety of hybrid strategies31 may be used, combining the tar‐
geting of enforcement efforts based on prior behaviour (as a predictor of current
company compliance) with a risk assessment based on intrinsic characteristics of
the activity (such as the type of industry, processes, location and size). The idea of
such a risk-based enforcement is to use the enforcement efforts in such a way as
to maximize the cost-effectiveness of enforcement.32 Unfortunately, however,
there is, according to Gunningham, “very little available empirical evidence” as to
how risk-based enforcement operates in practice.33 That is why we will now
attempt to review some of the available empirical literature in this domain.
B Effectiveness of Targeting Strategy: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?
We will now consider two regulatory areas: existing literature that considered the
effectiveness of risk-based approaches to environmental inspections, and an anal‐
ysis of data on occupational safety and health inspections in several European
countries, which apply different approaches to enforcement.
I Perspectives on Risk-Based Environmental Enforcement
In the environmental field, there is some empirical evidence to support the effec‐
tiveness of such a targeting strategy: Friesen showed that “by targeting enforce‐
ment efforts on specific segments of the regulated community, greater compli‐
ance with environmental regulations [could] be achieved”.34 The fact that an
enforcement agency (such as an environmental protection agency) “shows a cer‐
tain degree of tolerance with respect to specific violations” does not necessarily
mean that the enforcement agency “goes soft”, but rather that it maximizes the
available budget and thus the enforcement efforts.35
Also, Rousseau showed that the Environmental Inspection Agency in the
Flemish Region in Belgium uses targeting to select firms it will routinely inspect
and bases this selection on past compliance behaviour and on received com‐
plaints.36 “Firms are inspected more frequently as long as the environmental
30 This can both depend upon the likelihood of violation, but also upon the potential magnitude of
the damage when violation occurs.
31 Gunningham, 2011, at pp. 184-186.
32 Ibid., at p. 188.
33 Ibid., at p. 189.
34 L. Friesen, ‘Targeting Enforcement to Improve Compliance with Environmental Regulations’,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2003, pp. 72-85.
35 Ibid.
36 S. Rousseau, ‘Timing of Environmental Inspections: Survival of the Compliant’, Journal of Regula‐
tory Economics, Vol. 32, 2007, pp. 17-36.
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problem persists”.37 Once the problem is solved, “firms only receive routine
inspections”.38 Hence, firms move relatively easy back to the “good” group.39
Rousseau argues that higher deterrence could be achieved by lowering the proba‐
bility of escaping from the “bad” group, which is effectively equal to one in Flan‐
ders.40 Thus, the deterrence potential of targeting could even be better exploited.41
In these cases where companies lack adequate information, a deterrence
approach may fail and a cooperative enforcement style could be more effective.
This was also confirmed in an experimental study by Alpizar and others who
showed that there are substantial learning outcomes from inspections, meaning
that compliance with the desired pollution reduction targets were substantially
higher in a second period when the firm was accurately informed about the con‐
tents of their obligations.42
Another study by Rousseau equally focuses on the Flemish textile industry.
She investigates costs and benefits associated with specific monitoring and
enforcement campaigns by the environmental authorities. She shows that such
campaigns can play a beneficial role in an effective and efficient monitoring pol‐
icy. Such a campaign is considered as an example of a filtered monitoring
approach whereby the inspection agency monitors through project-related
inspection. She argues that filtering has additional benefits to targeting (which
would be based only on standard routine and reactive inspections).43 The filtering
approach implies the selection of firms for thorough audits based on certain sig‐
nals, which leads according to her research to a more efficient use of the limited
funds available to the inspection agency. She noticed that as a result of this fil‐
tered approach, many violations were detected, which were not likely to have
been detected during routine inspections.44
A study by Earnhart and Glicksman focuses (again) on the traditional dichot‐
omy between the deterrence and cooperative approach. They analyse the effects
of the two approaches on environmental management practices in relation to the
compliance with waste water discharge limits imposed on chemical manufactur‐
ing facilities. Their results reveal that a more cooperative relationship induces
better environmental management and they conclude that “environmental regu‐
lators seeking to induce better environmental management practices should
employ a more cooperative approach, not a more coercive approach”.45 Murphy
and Stranlund examine via laboratory experiments individual responses to poli‐
cies that seek to encourage firms to voluntarily disclose violations of environmen‐
37 Ibid., at p. 34.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 F. Alpizar et al., ‘Collective Versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambi‐
ent Pollution’, Environmental & Resource Economics, Vol. 29, 2004, pp. 231-252.
43 Rousseau, 2010.
44 Ibid., at pp. 207-208.
45 D.H. Earnhart & R.L. Glicksman, ‘Coercive versus Cooperative Enforcement: Effect of Enforce‐
ment Approach on Environmental Management’, International Review of Law and Economics, Vol.
42, 2015, pp. 135-146.
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tal standards.46 They find that while it is possible to motivate a significant num‐
ber of voluntary disclosures without adversely affecting environmental quality,
this result is sensitive to both the fine for disclosed violations and the assump‐
tion that firms know their compliance status without additional cost. When firms
have to expand resources to determine their compliance status, this may worsen
environmental quality.
An empirical study by Helland47 on the role of targeting in water pollution
regulations in the American pulp and paper industry shows that the main effect
of targeting is to encourage firms to report violations they detect and presumably
take steps to correct them. However, whereas targeting may produce more coop‐
eration (through self-reporting) it does not necessarily deter violations. Another
interesting study by Liu and Yang48 examined the effects of the high-priority vio‐
lation (HPV) policy as a way to target enforcement in environmental regulations.
The average number of inspections on HPV facilities was more than 4 times
higher than that of none-HPV facilities. They find substantial general deterrence
effects of the policy, but argue that the efficiency of targeting is undermined by
the lower responsiveness of the targeted group. That was due to high abatement
costs for the targeted group (some HPV facilities could not further reduce emis‐
sion levels even when facing high inspection probability), and to the fact that not
all EPA regional offices followed the HPV policy to the full extent. These findings
show that, notwithstanding the potential positive effects from targeting, some
limitations of targeting policy need to be taken into account as well.49 Finally,
Gray and Shadbegian analysed compliance by paper mills in the 1980s and found
that the responsiveness to enforcement is strongly related to plant characteris‐
tics. Differences in responsiveness were found to relate to firm as well as to plant
characteristics. Plants owned by larger firms were less responsive to inspection
actions.50
It is also important to balance such considerations with findings suggesting
the overall limited effectiveness of deterrence effects compared, for instance, to
legitimacy and procedural justice effects.51 In a recent review of research on legal
46 J.J. Murphy & J.K. Stranlund, ‘An Investigation of Voluntary Discovery and Disclosure of Envi‐
ronmental Violations using Laboratory Experiments’, University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
Department of Resource Economics, Working Paper, No. 2005-7, available at: www. umass. edu.
resec/ workingpapers.
47 E. Helland, ‘The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations and Self-Report‐
ing’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 80, No. 1, 1998, pp. 141-153.
48 L. Liu & Z. Yang, ‘High Priority Violation Policy and Targeting Enforcement: An Empirical Analy‐
sis of its Effectiveness and Efficiency’, Sam Houston State University Department of Economics
and International Business Working Paper Series, 2014, No. 14-11, available at: www. shsu. edu/
academics/ economics -and -international -business/ documents/ wp_ series/ wp14 -11_ paper. pdf.
49 Those will be further addressed in Section E.
50 W.B. Gray & R.J. Shadbegian, ‘When and Why Do Plants Comply? Paper Mills in the 1980s’, Law
& Policy, Vol. 27, 2005, pp. 238-261 and for similar results N. Gunningham, D. Thornton, & R.A.
Kagan, ‘Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection’, Paper
presented at the Centre for the Study of Law and Society, Jurisprudence Social Policy Pro‐
gramme, University of California Berkeley, 2003.
51 Tyler, 2003.
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compliance of businesses, Hodges52 similarly concludes that the effects of deter‐
rence are limited at best, and that most corporate behaviour is influenced by
other drivers. He also shows that the type of relationship between regulator and
duty holders is essential to predict behaviour, e.g. voluntary reporting of prob‐
lems. In the aviation industry, for instance, self-reporting is encouraged in the UK
and generally in the EU by a “no fault” approach, whereby voluntary reporting of
incidents will not lead to sanctions. Thus, the effectiveness of a targeting strategy
is likely to be conditioned also by other aspects of the regulatory enforcement
approach, which foster (or not) the legitimacy of the regulatory system and coop‐
eration between actors.
II Comparing Different Approaches to Occupational Safety and Health Enforcement
We will now briefly look at the performance of two countries in Occupational
Health and Safety (OHS). The United Kingdom and Germany share enough in
terms of development history, income level, social structure etc. to be considered
roughly comparable for our purpose. Standardized statistics for OHS are provided
by the European Statistical Office (Eurostat), which makes data easily compara‐
ble.
While many OHS indicators are of relatively low reliability, the data for fatal
accidents is widely held to be reliable because, for obvious reasons, fatal accidents
are nearly always recorded, and an investigation takes place (meaning that work-
related fatal accidents cannot so easily be “hidden” as non-work-related ones). In
addition, data on the number of inspections in the OHS sphere is publicly availa‐
ble in the two countries.53
A proper comparison of the level of inspections in the two countries requires
an adjustment for the difference in size in the employed population and the num‐
ber of businesses. Considering different possible indicators (number of busi‐
nesses with 10 employees or more, number of persons employed in non-zero
employees businesses, total employed population etc.) gives an approximate aver‐
age ratio close to 1.4 (Germany to the United Kingdom). Using this ratio to cor‐
rect the ratio of the number of OHS inspections in Germany and the United King‐
dom shows that they were always more than 3 times more frequent in Germany
between 2006 and 2011, and in 2013 inspections were more than 5 times more
frequent in Germany (the numbers decreased in both countries, but faster in the
United Kingdom). Thus, there is little doubt that the inspection pressure is vastly
lower in the United Kingdom. Combined with an approach that emphasizes
strong support for compliance (both during inspections and through very active
52 C. Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour: Integrating Theories of Regulation, Enforcement, Compli‐
ance and Ethics, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015.
53 This section is a summary of a more detailed research still to be published. It draws also on L.
Tilindyte, Enforcing Health and Safety Regulation. A Comparative Economic Approach, Antwerp,
Intersentia, 2012. Sources of data can be accessed here: (1) Eurostat: http:// ec. europa. eu/
eurostat/ web/ health/ health -safety -work/ data/ database, (2) Germany: www. baua. de/ de/
Informationen -fuer -die -Praxis/ Statistiken/ Suga/ Suga. html, (3) UK: webarchive. nationalarchives.
gov. uk/ 20160106104255/ http:// discuss. bis. gov. uk/ focusonenforcement/ regulator -data -201213
and www. hse. gov. uk/ lau/ enforcement -lae1 -returns. htm.
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development of hands-on guidance, brochures etc. which are all easily accessible),
this leaves little doubt that the burden on businesses from OHS inspections is far
lower in the United Kingdom.
Outcomes in terms of safety, if assessed through the incidence of fatal occu‐
pational accidents, appear to be also to the United Kingdom’s advantage. Consid‐
ering fatal accidents excluding traffic- and transport-related ones,54 the United
Kingdom consistently, since the start of Eurostat data, has been the best per‐
former in the EU. Its average incidence was 1.4 for 1998-2007 and 0.62 for
2008-2013.55 Germany’s average incidence was 2.1 for 1998-2007 (close to the
EU-15 average of 2.4), and a much improved 0.87 for 2008-2013 (now much
lower than the EU-15 average of 1.5) – but still higher than the United King‐
dom’s.56
In short, with considerably fewer inspections the United Kingdom has consis‐
tently achieved better OHS performance than Germany. Among possible explana‐
tions one could definitely cite the way the OHS system in the United Kingdom is
risk-based, both in terms of regulation and of enforcement. Since the 1974 Health
and Safety at Work Act, the duties of employers in the United Kingdom are
defined in terms of achieving the best possible safety outcomes, rather than
through a list of specific standards to be complied with, and there is a strong
emphasis on risk assessment. Targeting of inspections and enforcement practices
are risk-based and risk-proportional. Guidance and compliance support are cen‐
tral to inspectors’ tasks and to the HSE’s role. Data seems to clearly validate the
effectiveness of the approach, with all the necessary caution due to the impossi‐
bility of achieving precise attribution of results to different causes.
This brief overview of the empirical literature therefore shows that it is diffi‐
cult to come to general conclusions on the effectiveness of targeting strategies.
Most of the empirical literature we discussed (such as the studies by Rousseau
and Friesen) show that targeting enforcement efforts do indeed lead to higher
compliance, thus confirming the assumption concerning the effectiveness of tar‐
geting strategies formulated in theoretical literature. Yet, the number of studies
is relatively limited and the precise conditions under which targeting may work
are not always clearly identified. Moreover, the comparison of the UK and Ger‐
many as far as the enforcement of OHS regulation is concerned, also underscores
the importance of targeting: even though the UK had a substantially lower num‐
ber of inspectors than Germany, safety outcomes in the UK seemed to be better
(although it is of course impossible to prove a clear causal link simply on the basis
of this comparison of data). Given the first promising results of those empirical
studies, there is also increasing interest in targeting strategies among policy mak‐
ers, as we will show in the next section.
54 In the United Kingdom these are not covered by OHS inspectors but by the traffic police, and
therefore their incidence does not reflect on the performance of OHS inspections in the United
Kingdom.
55 Change in Eurostat series between the two periods.
56 Including traffic- and transport-related accidents reduces the gap but the difference is still to the
United Kingdom’s advantage.
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C Smart Enforcement in Practice
While the evidence base to demonstrate the effectiveness of “smart enforcement”
is still limited, we can conclude from the above that it is clearly encouraging. Pol‐
icy makers at several levels (international institutions such as the World Bank
Group and the OECD, national governments etc.) have become increasingly inter‐
ested in smart enforcement as well. Agencies interested in introducing smart
enforcement may find inspiration in the OECD best practice principles on regula‐
tory enforcement and inspections (A). There is large experience with smart
enforcement in the UK. This not only relates to the example provided above of
the enforcement of OHS regulation; different management tools have been devel‐
oped in several policy areas in the UK, which are largely in line with a smart
enforcement approach (B).
I OECD Best Practice Principles on Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections
Policy makers looking for guidance on how to introduce or strengthen risk-based
approaches to enforcement can look to the 2014 OECD Best Practice Principles for
Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections. Drawing on research into accepted best
practices in OECD members and beyond,57 these articulate a form of prevailing
consensus on why risk-based approaches are recommended, what they consist of,
and how to put them into practice. They purport to help improve transparency
and predictability, effectiveness and efficiency. They cover strategy and processes,
institutions and methods.
The first four principles are to base enforcement priorities, allocation of
resources, targeting etc. on evidence (data), employ state-led inspections and
enforcement only when this is demonstrably the best approach to ensure compli‐
ance, and use risk-assessment (with risk defined as the combination of probabil‐
ity and potential magnitude of hazard) both for the targeting of inspections and
enforcement decisions.
Principles 5-8 relate to institutions. They emphasize the importance of hav‐
ing a clear, stable government policy on enforcement (to avoid short-term crisis-
or elections-driven changes that do not allow the development of robust, profes‐
sional institutions). They call for coherence and coordination in the way enforce‐
ment mandates are allocated among different institutions, to avoid overlaps,
duplication and gaps. They require a governance model for enforcement institu‐
tions that avoids political interference in daily operational decisions, ensures pro‐
fessionalism, and avoids instability linked to excessive concentration of powers.
They also recommend the adoption of information systems that allow for effec‐
tive data sharing between different institutions.
Finally, the last three principles are concerned with people and practices:
clarity and fairness of decisions should be ensured through clear rules and bal‐
57 The Principles draw to a significant extent on the UK experience, but also on practices from coun‐
tries as diverse as the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Italy, Lithuania etc. – and on lessons
learned from negative experiences with inspections and enforcement all across the OECD, and in
other parts of the world.
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anced rights and responsibilities for both inspectors and duty holders, the
emphasis for enforcement agencies should be on promoting compliance (rather
than “catching” as many violations as possible), and the need for inspectors to
have professional skills that not only include both strong, up-to-date technical
knowledge, but also specific “inspections and enforcement” competences such as
risk assessment, compliance promotion, investigation etc.
These principles are of course by no means fully comprehensive, nor limita‐
tive – and they require a good deal of adaptation to each specific situation and
environment. They represent, however, the consolidation of an emerging consen‐
sus on how, given a set of policy priorities, regulations and resources, the best
possible combination of inspections and enforcement outcomes can be achieved.
II Country-Level Experience – The Case of the UK
Several countries have, to varying degrees, made significant efforts to make
inspections and enforcement “smarter” and more risk-based. This includes for
instance the Netherlands or Lithuania,58 and a number of other countries inside
the OECD and EU, and beyond. We will focus here on the case of the UK both
because it has been one of the first (following the 2005 Hampton Review, but also
earlier in individual agencies) to follow such a route, and because it presents a
number of interesting practices that cover most aspects of a balanced “smart”
approach.
Efforts to optimize the effectiveness and efficiency of inspections have a long
history in the UK. Hawkins’ very important work on enforcement practices in the
United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive (2002) considers in great detail
and depth the practices of inspectors, the framework which influences their deci‐
sions, and the ways in which the agency’s management attempts to shape them.
It does this, however, without a specific focus on the question of risk, but rather
at the notion of discretion and with a very open investigation of all the drivers
that may be at play – and with a specific focus on the enforcement rather than on
the inspection phase. Overall, a relatively “diffuse” notion of risk permeates both
Hawkins’ work and the culture and framework in which he sees inspectors as
operating – but not (as this was not the purpose of his research) a “picture” of
what a “risk-based inspections practice” may look like.
A practical example of guidance aiming at genuinely risk-based implementa‐
tion of inspections and enforcement decisions is provided by the UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE) through its Enforcement Management Model (EMM). The
EMM’s purpose is to “promote enforcement consistency by confirming the
parameters, and the relationships between the many variables, in the enforce‐
ment decision-making process”, to “promote proportionality and targeting by
confirming the risk-based criteria against which decisions are made” and to “be a
framework for making enforcement decisions transparent, and for ensuring that
those who make decisions are accountable for them” (p. 5). While it does not
replace or limit inspectors’ discretion, it aims to guide it (in particular for less
58 OECD, Regulatory Policy in Lithuania. Focusing on the Delivery Side, Paris, OECD, 2015, available at:
www. oecd. org/ countries/ lithuania/ regulatory -policy -in -lithuania -9789264239340 -en. htm.
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experienced inspectors). The EMM includes a number of “decision trees”, rating
tables and matrices helping inspectors to make decisions based on risk. The EMM
is a significant step (and, to our knowledge at least, unique – at least in its specif‐
icity) in making inspections and enforcement simultaneously more risk-based,
more responsive, and more consistent.
To put such tools to good use, however, competent inspectors are needed. In
fact, the more flexibility is introduced, the more discretion is needed, the finer
the assessment of risk required – the more competent inspectors are indispensa‐
ble.59 This notion of “competency”, however, includes more than just technical
skills (relating to food safety, occupational safety and health, environmental pro‐
tection etc.), but should also encompass skills relating to risk assessment, investi‐
gation, relations with business operators and their staff, compliance promotion
etc. In the UK, a model has been developed in recent years, building on work done
within the HSE. This effort involves a number of regulators and professional
associations of regulatory staff, is led by BRDO, and has produced a Competency
Approach. This is based on a set of “core skills” that are complemented by “techni‐
cal skills” (rather than seeing core skills as “soft skills” they are put first).
The approach is fundamentally turned towards practice, and is thus not
articulated in any lengthy document (only short summaries exist), but rather is
supported by two web portals. The first is used for self-assessment (Regulators
Development Needs Assessment – RDNA60) and the second for information and
training (Guidance for Regulators – Information Point – GRIP61).
As can be seen for instance in the HSE’s Enforcement Policy Statement,62 a bal‐
anced inspections and enforcement approach involves the targeted use of a range
of instruments – “information, and advice, both face to face and in writing”,
warnings, and an escalating range of sanctions. A really “smart” approach to
inspections includes of course this differentiation in dealing with problems found
during inspections, and it also considers inspection visits themselves as but one
of a range of possible interventions. Not only are inspections primarily targeted
at high-risk (and, to a lesser extent, medium-risk) objects, but there is also an
effort to understand which tools and approaches will be effective to achieve
improvements in compliance (and, more broadly, in safety) in particular groups
of establishments. In its own “risk-intervention” pyramid, the UK BRDO sees the
default type of intervention in low-risk establishments as information and guid‐
ance.63 Even in cases where risk is not trivial, but inspections would be ineffec‐
tive, looking for alternative interventions is essential.
59 Bardach and Kagan, supra note 14, showed that, conversely, insufficiently competent inspectors
tended to ‘go by the book’ (pp. 128-129) and be both more ‘unreasonable’ and less effective at
managing risks.
60 http:// rdna -tool. lbro. org. uk.
61 www. regulatorsdevelopment. info/ grip.
62 HSE Enforcement Policy Statement, available at: www. hse. gov. uk/ pubns/ hse41. pdf.
63 Internal documentation, unpublished presentations, interviews with management.
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Another example of a “smart” approach is the development and roll out of the
“Safer Food, Better Business” (SFBB) toolkit.64 The development of the toolkit
was a response to the entry into force of the new EU “Hygiene Package”; and the
approach taken stemmed from the finding that many catering businesses had
fundamental problems with compliance because of ignorance or misunderstand‐
ing of safety requirements, and that this required an approach based on guidance
and compliance promotion. In addition, UK food safety authorities had identified
the importance of outreach to the many non-English-speaking professionals
working in the country’s food industry. One of the experiments leading to this
acknowledgement was made in Chinatown by the Westminster City authorities.65
After finding that cases of non-compliance in restaurants were not only frequent,
but also not improving after repeated inspections, the Westminster regulatory
team attempted to understand why. They found out that chefs mostly did not
really understand English well, were not aware of local safety regulations,
changed repeatedly, and that an inspection with negative findings resulted in a
loss of face that made compliance, if anything, even less likely. The response was
to emphasize prior training, and to use the chefs’ language as much as possible.
Along these lines, the SFBB toolkit exists in 16 languages, those most wide‐
spread among chefs working in the UK.
D Critical Issues
So far, we have indicated that there is a strong theoretical backing for the target‐
ing of regulatory inspections and for a so-called “smart enforcement” (2), and
that empirical research also provides some support for this trend (3). Moreover,
policy makers are also increasingly implementing these ideas concerning smart
enforcement, as the discussion of the OECD Principles and the UK example illus‐
trate (4). However, regarding the specific application of “smart enforcement” in
practice a variety of questions still arise that require a further deepening of the
theoretical basis for smart enforcement, taking into account the practical experi‐
ences. First, there has to be an adequate definition and understanding of “risk”,
and of how and where it can be applied – which goes beyond simple enforcement,
but rather is relevant to “smart regulation” more broadly (A). Second, risk-based
targeting essentially fits into a pro-active approach towards monitoring (B). A
fully fledged risk-based targeting focuses both on the likelihood of harm as well as
on the potential severity and magnitude (C), but obviously requires data collec‐
tion and information sharing between agencies (D).
I Defining “Risk” and “Risk-Based” – Using Risk to Improve Regulation
If we are to properly assess the possible usefulness and effectiveness of risk-based
inspections and enforcement, we first need to define what they entail, and what
64 See the Food Standards Agency portal, available at: www. food. gov. uk/ business -industry/ caterers/
sfbb.
65 Short case study by the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health, available at: www. cieh. org/
library/ Knowledge/ Food_ safety_ and_ hygiene/ Case_ studies/ Westminster%20CHIP. pdf.
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“best practice” consensus may exist. Indeed, some studies have at times presented
disappointing results from “risk-based” practices66 since, upon closer considera‐
tion, the cases examined did not really correspond to what would be accepted as
“good risk-based practice”.
The UK Better Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO)’s 2012 Common Approach to
Risk Assessment outlines the different levels at which “risk assessment” (and,
more broadly, risk-based approaches) can be applied in the regulatory sphere:
“strategic risk”, “priorities between national and local risk”, “operational risk”,
“risk assessment of individual businesses” and “sanctioning according to risk” (pp.
3-4). Mertens67 suggests a classification that focuses more on the risk assessment
and management stages that take place within an inspectorate (p. 271). His clas‐
sification has two broad levels. First a systemic one, which corresponds to the
strategic inspection framework, defining priorities and programming. The output
of the systemic stage is a classification of categories of risk level per type of estab‐
lishment, and an action programme. Second, an operational level, which corre‐
sponds to the operational organization of inspections, involving information
gathering and definition of specific focus.
The output of this second stage is an overview of results of prior inspections
for each establishment, and an inspections plan.
Whereas policy makers can, in practice, decide to regulate even if a realistic
assessment would indicate that resources are insufficient, the regulation ill-
designed, the goals unachievable, inspectorates cannot stretch resources beyond
what they have. Thus, if they do not prioritize they will generally end up having to
visit an unrealistically high number of premises (or check an unrealistically high
number of products), meaning that each inspection will have to be very short.
There are only three possibilities in the absence of risk-based planning: “blanket”
coverage (every establishment/product is controlled), random inspections, or
selection on a basis other than risk. In the first case, each inspection will have to
be so short (except in rare cases of inspectorates dealing with a very small field)
that it will be essentially useless – and, in fact, within a given establishment inspec‐
tors will be unable to control everything, hence there will be selectivity anyway
(by default). In the second, there is formal “equality” (everyone has equal chances
of being visited), but no uniformity in fact (some are visited, some not), and a
clearly less-than-optimal resource allocation. In the third case, in the absence of a
rational, somewhat objective instrument for selection, inspections end up being
targeted based on convenience of inspectors, potential for flattering numbers (of
fines, for instance), or rent-seeking. In other words, risk-based inspections are
not an alternative to “non-selective” inspections, but to “selective by default”.
66 See, e.g. H. Yan, J. van der Heijden & B. van Rooij, ‘Contextual Compliance: Situational and Sub‐
jective Cost-Benefit Decisions about Pesticides by Chinese Farmers’, Law & Policy, Vol. 37, No. 3,
2015.
67 F. Mertens, Inspecteren: Toezicht Door Inspecties, The Hague, Sdu Uitgevers, 2011.
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II Pro-Active versus Re-Active Enforcement
Understanding risk-based inspections requires also consideration of the question
of re-active versus pro-active planning of inspections. Inspection agencies can visit
establishments either because they respond to a complaint or request or a tip-off
of some sort (, re-active inspections), or on the basis of their own planning, with‐
out any external trigger (, pro-active inspections).68 While re-active inspections
require fewer resources, they also tend to be less effective, because the quality of
complaints-based information is frequently problematic.69 There are also impor‐
tant biases in complaints; environmental complaints by private persons tend to
be biased towards “nuisances” rather than very significant pollution issues, and
cannot form a sound basis for enforcement activity), as well as major gaps. In
consumer issues, Van Boom and Loos70 show that in the cases of repeated
infringements with only limited loss for consumers there is generally under-liti‐
gation. The propensity to complain, in addition, is strongly linked to a number of
social and cultural parameters. A recent OECD study of regulations in Lithuania
(2015) shows that there is a real problem of excessive use of reactive inspections
by the market surveillance inspectorate, and that the vast majority of complaints
is trivial, or relate to issues that are not regulated by law (pp. 133-134).
“Pro-activity” and “re-activity” are linked to the issue of risk-based targeting
(or its absence), but in a somewhat complex way. In principle, complaints and
other “tip-offs” can and should be integrated within a well thought-through risk-
based targeting model. In practice, however, inspectorates that rely very strongly
on complaints tend to have a very weak risk-orientation, if any. On balance, it
appears clear that a risk-based approach to inspections means that an over‐
whelming majority of inspections would be pro-active, and data-driven, rather
than re-active and complaints-driven.
III Risk-Based Targeting in Practice
Selecting enterprises to be (pro-actively) inspected based on their risk profile
requires the combination of the likelihood of harm with its potential severity and
magnitude. Doing so in an effective way requires dis-aggregating the processes
that may lead to harm, in order to understand what are the causes of the harms
that the inspectorate seeks to prevent, and to ensure focus on the right issues and
establishments.71 There are different ways to structure the classification that is to
form the instrument for planning. One approach72 is to form a matrix with two
68 D.J. Black, ‘Production of Crime Rates’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 35, 1970, pp. 733-748;
Tilindyte, 2012.
69 Tilindyte, 2012.
70 W.H. van Boom & M. Loos, ‘Effective Enforcement of Consumer Law in Europe. Private, Public,
and Collective Mechanisms’, in W.H. van Boom & M. Loos (Eds.), Collective Enforcement of Con‐
sumer Law in Europe. Securing Compliance in Europe through Private Group Action and Public Author‐
ity Intervention, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2007, pp. 231-254.
71 Mertens, 2011, at pp. 272-273.
72 Better Regulation Delivery Office, 2012; World Bank Group, Good Practices for Construction Regu‐
lation and Enforcement Reform: Guidelines for Reformers, Washington, DC, 2013, available at:
http:// documents. worldbank. org/ curated/ en/ 662881468170967367/ Good -practices -for -
construction -regulation -and -enforcement -reform -guidelines -for -reformers.
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axes – one corresponding to the likelihood of harm (including the likelihood of
non-compliance, but not limited to it – World Bank Group version) or the likeli‐
hood of violation (BRDO version), and the second to the potential severity and
magnitude. In such an approach, intrinsic risk and management risk are some‐
what aggregated in the way they are presented (even though, analytically, they
are to be handled separately). Another is the approach presented by Mertens73
where the risk classification is done purely on the basis of intrinsic risk, and then
a level of inspection priority is determined by crossing the resulting risk level
with the compliance history or expectation (risk management).
In any case, a fully fledged risk-based targeting should take into account a set
of risk components that includes (a) intrinsic risk of the activity (hazardousness);
(b) scope/size of the activity (number of people who could be affected, or other
relevant indicators); (c) additional relevant vulnerability factors (e.g. types of pop‐
ulations affected, location etc.); (d) likelihood of harm. This last element can itself
be split into intrinsic likelihood, and management-related likelihood, otherwise
known as “compliance risk”. Intrinsic likelihood may be combined with “intrinsic
risk”, in which case intrinsic likelihood and intrinsic severity are handled sepa‐
rately. The relative weight that is given to each of these factors can vary, even
though most “matrix” models suggest that severity and likelihood should overall
be given equal consideration. Precise methodologies on this issue differ widely.
The ways in which these are rated, graded, measured etc. also vary considerably,
with some agencies having far more sophisticated and “data-driven” models,
some far more “qualitative” approaches.74 The use of “qualitative” indicators does
not mean the rating systems are necessarily simple – the Food Standards Agency
in England and Wales has indicators that are mostly not data-driven, but a rating
system that incorporates a number of dimensions and a sophisticated set of
check-lists.
Once a classification has been created, as well as a grading/rating tool to
assign a risk rating or category to each establishment (or product, or more gener‐
ally “inspection object”), targeting involves assigning a category or rating to each
concrete object, and to decide on an actual plan of inspections. These are two con‐
ceptually separate processes (whichever way they are actually conducted in prac‐
tice).
If we look first at the question of planning, it involves matching resources to
the needs, establishing “typical frequencies” for different risk categories, and also
adding (or not) an element of “random selection”. The guiding principle of a risk-
based approach is that high-risk establishments should be visited far more regu‐
larly and frequently, that low-risk ones may not even warrant regular visits at all,
and that the classification should be done in a way that results in only a minority
of businesses being at the “peak” of the “risk pyramid”.75 In order to keep a “real‐
ity check” on whether the classification and ratings are adequate, and to avoid
73 Mertens, 2011, at pp. 273-274.
74 See J. Black & R. Baldwin, ‘Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation’, Law & Policy, Vol. 32, No. 2,
2010, pp. 181-213.
75 World Bank Group, 2013.
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creating incentives for non-compliance for low-risk businesses, it is often accep‐
ted that keeping some level of (rare) randomly selected inspection cases for the
low-risk category is a valid approach.76
Targeting and planning are but the first element of risk-based inspections,
and the way inspections are actually conducted “on the ground”, as well as the
way inspectors and their management follow up on them, are just as essential if
one is to have an approach that is really founded on risk. While there has been
scholarship focusing on how inspectors take decisions and interact with regulated
entities, there has been rather less on what they check (and what skills, experience
and culture influence it). In this respect we can recall the experiences in the UK,
both with the enforcement management model as well as with the “safer food,
better business” toolkit, discussed above. Those examples show that there is no
“one-size fits all” answer to what constitutes a smart inspection.
A “smart inspection” approach is one that recognizes both the importance of
inspections (and the need to conduct them in the most professional, efficient and
effective way) but also their limitations – and accordingly uses other tools as well
to promote compliance and public welfare.
IV Data Collection and Information Sharing
While the classification and the “indicative frequencies” for each risk category
provide the tools for the actual planning, replacing abstract categories with actual
“targets” of establishments to be visited, requires data as a foundation. At a mini‐
mum, this should consist of a list (database) of all establishments under supervi‐
sion, with at least some fundamental information on the most important param‐
eters that allow the risk level to be determined. In some cases, the database can
be very sophisticated, and be paired with an automated case selection system
(which also takes care of matching the frequency of visits with the available
resources etc.). However, in most cases, the systems are less sophisticated and
require a significant human input. In any case data is, in a number of jurisdictions
and agencies, the weakest link.
There are, however, frequent misconceptions around this, so it is important
to distinguish what is absolutely necessary from what is “good to have”, and to
understand what is the real level of operational challenges and resources
involved.
A common assumption is that putting in place effective data systems for risk-
based targeting and management of inspections would be very costly, and that
moving to a risk-based approach is thus a major investment for an inspectorate –
which, in turn, can be a reason to settle for avowedly inferior approaches to
inspections. Such concerns are voiced by Tilindyte77 and Baldwin.78 While in
theory building an information database on objects under supervision and a risk-
76 Black & Baldwin, 2010; M.K. Sparrow, The Character of Harms: Operational Challenges in Control,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
77 Tilindyte, 2012, at p. 42.
78 R. Baldwin, ‘Better Regulation: Tensions about the Enterprise’, in S. Weatherill (Ed.), Better Regu‐
lation, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 40.
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based targeting system from scratch may be expensive, in practice such an infor‐
mation database would in most cases not have to be built from zero, as significant
data is already available. Furthermore, gathering data on establishments under
supervision is something that naturally occurs anyway as part of each inspection.
The problem is that this data is often not managed properly, i.e. not entered into
systems that would make it useful for further analysis and planning. Another dif‐
ficulty is that in many contexts inspectorates do not share information among
themselves, which reduces the number of establishments they can cover in a
given year. In other words, there already are considerable “sunk costs” whereby
inspectorates have collected or are regularly collecting information, through their
main activity, i.e. inspections. The problem is how to best make use of this exist‐
ing data.
More effective sharing of information between different state bodies (and in
particular between those which have a regulatory and/or supervisory function) is
indeed an essential element of “smarter regulation”, if by this we understand a
way of regulating that would be both more efficient and more effective. This is
particularly true when it comes specifically to risk-based inspections because
information sharing is the key to improving data on establishments/products
under supervision, and making sure that risk information is comprehensive and
up-to-date. Information sharing can be done in a number of ways. At the local
level, the fact that most inspection fields are under a single department with local
authorities in the UK means that there is a good amount of information sharing
going on between them, and there is ongoing work to develop information sys‐
tems that will make this sharing more systematic and easier – and also ensure
that sharing happens between different regions.79 In the Netherlands, two sys‐
tems have been developed to allow for more effective sharing of information
between inspectorates (Inspectie View80) – and to allow inspectorates to access a
wealth of data on the business, avoiding duplicate submissions, specific queries
etc. (Ondernemingsdossier – “Enterprise File”81).
79 Which, in the past (and even currently), has been a significant problem at least in some areas,
which underlines the problem with various risk-assessment models (something the 2012 BRDO
Common Framework was precisely created to address).
80 The system has gradually developed over several years and was created to allow any inspector to
access data from other inspectorates on a given establishment/object – in particular prior inspec‐
tion records. There is a general level (Inspectie View Bedrijven – ‘Inspection View for Companies’)
which can be used for planning and aggregates inspections and results from Social Affairs, Envi‐
ronment and Transport, Food and Non-Food Products Inspectorates. There are then several ‘spe‐
cialized Inspectie View’ with a deeper level of information sharing (greater wealth of information,
e.g. on permits etc.) – for inland transport and environment (for now). For more information, see
Inspectieloket portal, available at: www. inspectieloket. nl/ organisatie/ index – and detailed files at
the project webpage, available at: www. informatieuitwisselingmilieu. nl/ publicaties. php ?id= 11.
81 The ‘Company File’ allows access to all the information the company decides to make available –
it is being rolled out gradually, by sub-sector of the economy, as it is run by businesses, not by
the public administration. More information is available at: www. ondernemingsdossier. nl. The
‘Company File’ can be seen as an attempt to not only avoid duplication of reporting require‐
ments, but also to access more information from businesses and thus make overall planning and
targeting more effective (see Baldwin & Black 2008, p. 31 on the importance of mobilizing the
private sector in gathering information).
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E Limits of Smart Enforcement
We indicated that there is a relatively strong theoretical justification for targeting
strategies (2) and there is some empirical support for the effectiveness of target‐
ing strategies, although the literature indicates that this effectiveness often
depends upon specific circumstances (3). It is therefore to some extent not sur‐
prising that smart enforcement is becoming increasingly popular with regulators,
although more in some legal systems (like the UK) than in others (like Germany).
The fact that not all regulators enthusiastically engage in a smart enforcement
approach may have a variety of explanations, some having to do with the inher‐
ent limits of risk-based enforcement, which have equally been pointed out in the
literature.82 One warning formulated in the literature is that risk-based inspec‐
tion can be based “on mock objectivity, which creates an illusion of control”.83
Presenting the enforcement problem in terms of risk suggests that the likelihood
of an adverse event occurring is based on probabilistic calculations, whereas “reg‐
ulators are often not dealing with risk but uncertainty”.84 Risk classifications may
suggest more objectivity than is justified, whereas they are often based on under‐
lying political choices.85 On the other hand, however, the alternative is not to be
seen as between an (inevitably imperfect) risk-based system, and a putatively per‐
fect one. Rather, risk-based targeting systems (and risk-proportional enforcement
guidelines) are introduced instead of practices that all exhibit serious problems,
such as discretionary selection by inspectors, “convenience-driven” selection
(whichever objects are closer, easier to control or more salient), attempts at uni‐
versal control (which disperse resources on too many objects), or random selec‐
tion.
None of these systems is perfect or non-problematic, and all of them tend to
be inferior in terms of effectiveness, of efficiency, and (with the exception of true
random selection) of transparency as well.
A second issue is that some countries may have concerns about the introduc‐
tion of risk-based governance since this approach may be felt to be in conflict
with particular governance norms (like equal treatment) or problematic from the
perspective of accountability demands. Rothstein et al. argue that this explains
why risk-based governance has been quite successful in the UK, but had a much
more limited application in countries such as France and Germany.86 These con‐
cerns may explain why risk-based governance is not developed in countries where
such approaches are considered to create normative conflicts (for example with
the idea of governance being based on security rather than risk in France, or con‐
stitutional concerns in Germany). Those concerns may therefore create obstacles
82 See, e.g., P. Mascini, ‘Comparing Assumptions Underlying Regulatory Inspection Strategies.
Implications for Oversight Policy’, in S. Slyke, F. Cullen & M. Benson (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook
of White Collar Crime, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 521-539.
83 Ibid., at p. 529.
84 Black & Baldwin, 2010, at p. 197.
85 Mascini, 2016, at p. 529.
86 H. Rothstein, O. Borraz & M. Huber, ‘Risk and the Limits of Governance: Exploring Varied Pat‐
terns of Risk-Based Governance across Europe’, Regulation & Governance, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2013.
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to the introduction of risk-based approaches. Closer investigation suggests, how‐
ever, that such concerns should not be exaggerated. Risk-based practices co-exist
with non-risk-based ones in most of these countries, suggesting that when there
is a real will, there can be a (legal) way. Risk-based practices have been introduced
in countries of diverse legal traditions, such as the UK, the Netherlands and Lith‐
uania, and issues related to specific legal and political cultures are maybe more
relevant to “how” rather than “whether” they can be used in a given country.
There is equally a concern that the risk-based approach would lead to a
“model myopia”87 whereby “risk-based systems will tend to neglect lower levels of
risk, which, if numerous and broadly spread, may involve cumulative dangers”. A
danger exists that risk-based enforcement would only focus on visible risks and
on larger risks, thus ignoring small violations of which the cumulative impact
could also be considerable. That is an important argument to still combine risk-
based enforcement with random inspections.88 This is why balanced risk-based
models used by enforcement agencies often incorporate a small level of inspec‐
tions of low-risk objects – rather than inspecting only high-risk ones, and never
low-risk ones, they inspect high-risk more often, and low-risk more rarely. This
also introduces a possibility of “reality check” of whether the risk criteria are cor‐
rect, and maintains a level of deterrence. This means that it is important to incor‐
porate inspections of low-risk facilities on a random basis within a risk-based
model of inspections.
The available empirical evidence (discussed in Section C) also pointed out
some limits of risk-based enforcement. Liu and Yang indicated some undermining
of the efficiency of targeting because certain operators confronted with high
abatement costs were less responsive to increased enforcement actions. Gray and
Shimshack also found that more frequent violators faced higher compliance costs
and were therefore less likely to respond to enforcement actions.89 Helland90
equally found that the costs of compliance appear critical to the decision to self-
report a violation.91 Moreover, he also found that especially for politically sensi‐
tive mills (those creating many employment opportunities for the surrounding
community) increased enforcement efforts would not speed up compliance but
would lead to strong lobbying by interest groups whose politics aimed for exam‐
ple at preventing the closure of a plant with the possible negative consequences
on the surrounding community.92 This points to the fact that “smarter” enforce‐
ment methods cannot fully make up for regulatory design: if regulatory require‐
ments are such that firms will be unwilling to comply regardless of enforcement,
targeting will do little to change the situation. The problems described by these
87 Black & Baldwin, 2010, at pp. 205-206.
88 Mascini, 2016, at p. 529.
89 W.B. Gray & J.P. Shimshack, ‘The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement:
A Review of the Empirical Evidence’, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 5, No. 3,
2011, pp. 19-20.
90 Helland, 1998.
91 See Hodges, 2015, regarding the effectiveness of ‘no fault’ regimes to incentivize self-reporting
and improve compliance.
92 Helland, 1998, at p. 152.
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authors would remain regardless of targeting practices, and are linked to regula‐
tory design, economic costs of regulation and political context. Moreover, in some
cases local regulators did not fully follow the targeting policy, obviously reducing
its effectiveness93 – but this is an implementation issue rather than a weakness of
the approach in itself.
Those studies and arguments do point to important limits of smart enforce‐
ment – but in fact many of them are limitations of enforcement in general, regard‐
less of methods. They are obviously not an argument against targeting, but rather
point to the importance of designing not only targeting and enforcement policies
in a smart way, but also as part of a broader approach to better regulatory design.
This can imply the introduction of guarantees to pursue the targeting policy in a
systematic manner,94 or to a recommendation to design decisions concerning tar‐
geting and enforcement at a more centralized level (thus avoiding the interest
group mechanisms that can prevent effective targeting as indicated by Helland.95
Moreover, it is equally important to recognize the resistance against risk-based
enforcement based on arguments of legal culture as identified by Rothstein et
al.96 Taking into account those limits leads to the conclusion that a targeting
approach can be combined with random inspections as well,97 in line with the
actual practice of many inspectorates that do not exclude inspections of low-risk
objects, but simply make them less frequent than that of high-risk ones. This is
also in line with literature on tax enforcement that equally showed that random
inspections are also necessary to achieve maximum compliance.98 Behavioural lit‐
erature has also indicated that randomizing apprehension strategies can exploit
the potential offenders ambiguity aversion in order to increase compliance.99
D Concluding Remarks
After Gunningham and Grabovsky coined the term “Smart Regulation” in 1998, it
became increasingly clear, both in scholarship as well as at the policy level, that
this smart regulation needed to be complemented with smart enforcement. The
broad notion of smart enforcement can, as we have shown in this article, appear
under various headings (varying from risk-based enforcement to targeting), in
some cases representing different notions, in other cases not. We showed that it
is not difficult to provide support for such a risk-based enforcement. Already as
early as 1982 Bardach and Kagan pointed at the fact that the “good inspector”
would not just focus on finding violations, but on solving problems for society.
Subsequent literature, from various directions (varying from criminology to Law
93 Liu and Yang, 2014.
94 Learning from the failure described by Liu and Yang, 2014.
95 Helland, 1998.
96 Rothstein et al., 2013.
97 Mascini, 2016, at p. 529.
98 Gray and Shimshack, 2011, at p. 20.
99 E. Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, ‘Any-Where Any-Time: Ambiguity and the Perceived Probability of
Apprehension’, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Vol. 84, 2015, pp. 27-59.
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and Economics) has, using different concepts, supported smart enforcement,
whereby obviously the smartness can relate to various moments in the enforce‐
ment chain, although most of the literature focuses on inspection and monitor‐
ing. The theoretical “Tit for Tat” game strategy provides the basis for targeting,
whereby (potential) offenders are divided into different groups and more resour‐
ces are spent on those groups where (based either on past performance or on ex
ante risk assessment) the benefits of enforcement are expected to be the largest.
Although the empirical evidence is, as often, not one directional, several stud‐
ies, especially from the UK, provide examples of how such a risk-based strategy is
applied in practice and, although causation is always difficult to measure, there
seems to be some evidence of its effectiveness. Policy makers are increasingly
interested in risk-based inspections, broadly defined, as we have shown by discus‐
sing examples from the UK and from the 2014 OECD Best Practice Principles for
Regulatory Enforcement.
Although, as indicated, smart enforcement can cover a variety of different
notions and be presented under different headings, a common feature seems to
be that it induces agencies to use a variety of tools to obtain better results from
enforcement efforts. In this article, we have tried, based on the available litera‐
ture and the examples of “smart enforcement”, to identify a few crucial features
that may make smart enforcement successful. One such feature is that smart
enforcement is usually pro-active rather than re-active (i.e. relying on planning
rather than waiting for complaints) and that it is based on specific tools related to
the risk profile of particular activities or industries. The risk profile requires com‐
bining the likelihood of harm with its potential severity and magnitude. The tools
that are developed on that basis focus not only on general planning (e.g. of spe‐
cific risk categories) but also on specific operational activity (with respect to par‐
ticular firms). The latter obviously also requires reliable data for agencies to use
and information sharing between agencies to make evidence-based enforcement
realistic. Notwithstanding the theoretical support that can be provided for smart
enforcement, and the strong empirical evidence that risk-based systems appear to
achieve higher effectiveness and efficiency than non-risk-based ones, there also
are some important limits of such a risk-based inspection approach. That is why a
risk-based strategy should never be used in an exclusive and simplistic manner
(inspecting only high-risk establishments), but rather in a graded way (frequency
increasing with risk), and/or combined with random visits.
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